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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON: THE
CHALLENGE POSED BY A TRANSITIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Ruti Teitel*
How does a transitional constitutionalism challenge the
constitutional canon? My recent book, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000), discusses constitutional theory in
periods of radical political upheaval, and offers a transitional
perspective on the American constitution. Here I merely highlight some ways that incorporating a transitional constitutionalism might challenge, as well as supplement, the dominant constitutional canon.
To begin, the very question of whether a transitional account ought to be brought to bear upon the canon illuminates its
underlying assumptions about the place of constitutional law in
our political scheme; that is, the extent to which the canon is
constituted by and constituting of a distinctive normative constitutional conception. In particular, I contend that the prevailing
canon derives from an understanding of American constitutionalism that is "foundational," and, by the same token, not transitional. The established account implies a certain structure, and
periodization, that define the Constitution's salient historical and
political context, and that also generate a canonical constitutional doctrine. Moreover, this foundational account privileges a
particular conception of constitutional change. It is a normative
account of the relation of constitutional law to political change
that privileges the role of law over politics. In this idealized account, the canonical narrative is constituted by select caselaw
that is said to construct constitutional transformation. To the extent that the dominant account seeks to relate to constitutional
law a notion of steady state constitutionalism, it emphasizes an
entrenched authoritative constitutional canon. A transitional
perspective would challenge many of the dominant account's
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conceptual assumptions, with a number of interpretive consequences. A transitional account problematizes foundational constitutionalism's assumptions by suggesting a less idealized and
more complicated view of the relation between constitutional
and political change. Reconfiguring this relationship implies
complicating the canon.
Consider the extent to which the narrative of American
constitutionalism represented in most law school texts is predicated upon a distinctive periodization, which one might consider
a canonical history. Conceiving of the first stage as the "founding" focuses scholarly attention on constitutionmaking and the
constitutional convention and ratification processes. It also focuses scholarly understanding of our constitutional culture upon
a circumscribed literature of the period, chiefly the writings of
the "founders." So canonical is this account that this version of
constitutional history has become virtually synonymous with
American constitutionalism.
Further, the canonical account is premised upon an understanding of constitutional change that emphasizes constitutional
proceduralism over other more substantive recognition rules.
This apparently autonomous view of constitutionmaking processes, and more generally of constitutional change, has consequences for the prevailing approaches to constitutional interpretation. The dominant view has shaped the scholarly debate of
the last decade over the question of what are the applicable
principles of constitutional interpretation. The content of the
canonical doctrine to a large degree follows from this arch understanding of our constitutional origins.
Reconceptualizing constitutional law's relationship to politics has consequences for the narrative of constitutional change
and, therefore, for constitutional doctrine. Deploying a transitional account would reconceptualize the canonical periodization. For starters, it would temporize the account in a way that
redirects our attention to more extensive periods of constitutional transformation. It would shift the analysis from established accounts of the processes of constitutional change to more
gradual and less radical forms. Adding a transitional account
would reconceive the critical periods and processes of constitutional change, and, relatedly, the relevant constitutional doctrine.1 A transitional perspective offers alternative narratives of
1.
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the Founding, Reconstruction and the New Deal with ramifications for canonical doctrine. 2
Deploying a transitional analysis would have further consequences. To a large extent, the canon is predicated on a distinctive understanding of an enduring constitution. Yet, from a
transitional perspective, this understanding is too crude. A transitional perspective contemplates a more nuanced approach to
constitutional interpretation, as it theorizes multiple constitutional modalities. The notion of differentiation of constitutional
modalities along a continuum of entrenchment contributes a
more dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation. The
proposed perspective of a constitution, which comprehends differentiated modalities, offers added available interpretive principles, with implications for rethinking the canonical doctrine.
This account clarifies for example, how portions of the constitutional text relate distinctly to particular transitional context and
circumstances. A transitional account would allow, for example,
understanding the extent to which the 1787 Constitution is in
some part ratifying of existing constitutional consensus, and in
other part constitutionally transformative. Adding a transitional
perspective to the available interpretive approaches would allow
a better understanding of the quintessentially American project
of constitutional transformation.
The proposed transitional evaluation would also enable a
better understanding of the extent to which constitutional transformational work is ongoing, with ramifications for applicable
principles of constitutional interpretation. Ultimately, deploying
a transitional analysis would help to expose the interpretive assumptions underlying the canon, but also it may constitute a
view of constitutionalism that is constructivist, and in the final
analysis, anti-canonical.
These thoughts are preliminary, as my book primarily focuses on the meaning of justice in transition, not on the American constitutional canon. Nevertheless, the constitutional component of the project points to a research agenda, which should
accepting my view of 1776-1789 as a "transition," see Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality
of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalism, 108
Yale L.J. 1931, 1940 n.23 (1999), citing Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role
of Law in Political Transformation, 106 Yale L.J. 2009 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 Yale L.J. 2215 (1999).
2. A not unrelated problematization of this doctrine are the contemporary challenges to the canonical account of the New Deal. See e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking
the New Deal Coun, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994).

240

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:237

be challenging of some of the meta-theoretical predicates of the
prevailing constitutional canon.

